

Stephan A. Schwartz

# Finding Saddam Hussein: A Study in Applied Remote Viewing

**O**n April 9, 2003, shortly after the American invasion of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, who had been president of that nation from July 16, 1979, was deposed and went into hiding. For the next several months, in spite of one of the most intense manhunts in history, his whereabouts remained unknown.

On November 3, 2003, an applied remote viewing experiment was carried out with the explicit purpose of locating and describing the circumstances and conditions of Saddam Hussein whereabouts. The experiment took place at the Edgar Cayce organization headquarters in Virginia Beach. I was teaching a workshop on remote viewing as part of a larger conference I had organized with almost all the founders of remote viewing including Russell Targ, Harold Puthoff, Ingo Swann, James Spottiswoode, Paul Smith, Skip Atwater, Dale Graff, as well as Edgar Evans Cayce, youngest son of Edgar Cayce, the most carefully documented remote viewer in history, and psychologist Henry Reed. It was a unique conference never again duplicated, and it attracted a large audience of some 500 people, including, as it turned out, a number of individuals from the military and intelligence world. Virginia Beach is relatively proximate to Washington, D.C. and Langley, Virginia, where the CIA is located.

At the end of the conference I put on a two-and-a-half-day workshop on remote viewing and 64 people self-selected to attend, both men and woman. They ranged in age from early 20s to early 70s. A number of them self-identified as active members of the military-intelligence community. They had heard about remote viewing and were, they said, very interested in understanding how it worked and actually experiencing a remote viewing session.

During the course of the first two morning sessions, after describing the process of remote viewing in some detail, I took the workshop participants through several triple-blind precognitive remote viewing sessions, asking them to describe a target image they would later be shown. There had been, as there usually is, considerable success. This constituted the training of the viewers.

At the midday break, a group of individuals, including three whom I knew to be involved with the military-intelligence community, came up to me and asked, “Can we do something real, something that has a real-world application, not just another target?”

During lunch I thought about how I could fulfill their request. I picked up a newspaper, and one of the above-the-fold stories was on the search, at that point fruitless, to find Saddam Hussein. I thought about that. Here was a highly numinous

target, one that was truly blind and that surely would have some kind of public ending. Millions of dollars were being spent to find Saddam Hussein with no success so far. It was a classic remote viewing challenge.

When the workshop group gathered again, I asked them, “Would you like to find Saddam Hussein?” and received a very positive response. So using the standard Mobius Consensus protocol<sup>1-14</sup> I have been using for decades to locate archaeological sites and solve crimes, I asked again, “How many would like to participate as viewers?” Forty-seven men and women chose to participate.

The experiment was double blind, that is neither the viewers, I, nor anyone in American government or armed forces, knew the answer; only Saddam Hussein himself and possibly some group of followers knew where he was.

In essence, when all of the geopolitical and media aspects are stripped away, the experiment was just a standard precognitive outbound protocol experiment, essentially the same as the hundreds of experiments Mobius and SRI carried out over three decades.<sup>15,16</sup>

## Experimenter Bias and Instructions

For over half a century there has been evidence in studies that nonlocal perception task performance can be influenced by the beliefs and expectations of the researcher.<sup>17,18,19,20,21</sup> For that reason I feel it is appropriate to say a word here about my own quite strong bias going into this experiment.

Saddam Hussein was a man noted for his fastidious personal hygiene. He had lived the sybaritic life of an autocrat for decades, and he had unlimited money. I assumed he would do what the violent dictator Idi Amin, President of Uganda from 1971 to 1979, had done. Amin’s exit hatch was a compliant Saudi government that let him set up a quiet but luxurious life in Jeddeh, Saudi Arabia. And that is where he remained untouched and unpunished until his death of kidney failure in the King Faisal Specialist Hospital and Research Centre in Jeddah, on August 16, 2003. Why, I thought, would Saddam Hussein not do the same? I assumed he would eventually be found somewhere in Saudi Arabia in a similar situation. I said nothing about this to the viewers, but that was my experimenter bias.

The task instruction for the remote viewing session was: “Please describe the location and circumstances of Saddam Hussein at the time his location becomes known to American forces. Please describe his appearance, his mind set, and any

other relevant details that come to mind.” For the next 20 minutes I would augment this by saying things like, “Saddam Hussein is standing before you. Look at him in your mind’s eye. Make a drawing. Write down the details of his clothing.”

The individual remote viewers each independently recorded their impressions in answer to the stated task and my subsequent questions in accordance with the process they had been taught. At the end of the session, this session data documentation was turned in to me. It was photocopied, and the originals were put aside for later notarization and archiving.

There were not, as would usually be the case, audio records of the sessions. The written words and drawings each viewer had created constituted the record of the remote viewing data produced by the 47 viewers.

Projects like this are different than archaeology projects, and are more akin to Mobius’ criminal and SRI’s spy work. In an archaeology project, each concept can be painstakingly evaluated, a process that can take months, even years. In a military crisis or criminal situation like the Saddam Hussein search, one knows going in that almost certainly it will never be possible to assess the accuracy of each concept, as one can do in an archaeology experiment. The strategy in a situation such as this one is to define the task to a narrow parameter. What task is being attempted? In this case, the task was to locate Saddam Hussein, to give military troops a kind of Google map they could follow that would lead them to him, and that would also tell them what to expect when they got there, as well as what he would be like. To achieve that, a great deal of data of necessity was discarded, and just two things were considered:

1 Points of consensus concerning the physical location and its description;

2 What are called low *a priori* observations (things which are very unlikely to be predictable, such as specifics about Hussein’s appearance on the day of his capture).

Additionally, because a number of viewers brought it up, I also assembled from their session data a sense of his state of mind at the time of his capture, although validating it seemed very improbable to me at the time. This analysis was then transformed into a series of hypotheses with which to guide subsequent fieldwork by a search team. That said, this was the analysis.

## Hypotheses

Seven consensual hypotheses emerged from my analysis of the data. The text in quotes is taken from the session records of the viewer participants as examples of how the consensus emerged:

1) **LOCATION:** Saddam will be found “beneath an ordinary looking house.” “It is on the outskirts of a small village,” “near Tikrit.” “The house is part of a small compound.” It is “bordered on one front by a dirt road and, on the backside, by a nearby river.” “The house can be identified because it has a large tree growing at either end, and it has a strange kind of partial second floor over the front door.”

2) **SADDAM HUSSEIN HIDING PLACE:** “Saddam Hussein has a hiding place.” “It is like a cavern or a ‘carved out space.’” It is “not visible but hidden underneath something.” “Breathing is possible in this small hidden space because there’s a vent tube built into this buried hiding space.”

3) **SADDAM HUSSEIN APPEARANCE:** “Saddam won’t look anything like he normally does.” “He looks like a homeless person.” He will be “dressed in dark clothing.” He will have a “ratty,” “unkempt” “salt and pepper beard.” His hair will be “wild.” In general, his “appearance will be disheveled.”

4) **SUPPORTERS:** At the time of his capture Saddam Hussein will have only “two or three supporters with him at the time of his discovery.”


5) **FIREARMS:** Saddam would have a gun, “but would put up no resistance when captured.”

6) **MONEY:** He would “have a quantity of money with him.”

7) **SADDAM HUSSEIN ATTITUDE:** “He will be defiant but will not put up any resistance; in fact he will be tired, and dispirited.”

## Unimpeachable Chronology


From a research perspective the key to an experiment like this is that it must have an unimpeachable chronology. The sequence of events has to be absolutely clear and documented for any assessment of nonlocally derived information to be achieved. The chronology is established in this way.



Pursuant to the protocol, the following morning, the originals of all the session documentation, as well as the hypotheses derived from an analysis of the session data, were put into two envelopes and turned over to the Cayce Foundation archivist. The archivist sealed the envelopes, signed across the flap, put her notary stamp on the envelopes, and put them in the Foundation's archives under her control.



The Cayce Foundation Archive Vault



Envelopes containing original material. Note Notary seal and signature across flap.

In the workshop's final session, to give the viewers some minimal feedback, I outlined for them the operational hypotheses that had arisen from the consensus protocol analysis. I explained that if this were an archaeological project the next step would be to go to the location selected and expect to find there what had been described. I stressed that using remote viewing information there is no searching, just finding, or not.

In this case, I told them, we would just have to follow the media to learn how it all came out. For further feedback, an article about the experiment would appear in the Cayce organization's magazine, *Venture Inward*.<sup>22</sup>

## Outcome and Assessment

More than a month would go by, until December 13, 2003, when a small force of Americans aided by some Iraqis, operating under what the military called Operation Red Dawn, discovered and captured Saddam Hussein. In the following days declassified material appeared in the media that allowed the accuracy of the seven hypotheses developed from the remote viewing session data to be evaluated. The question to be assessed was: Could the information provided weeks earlier in the remote viewing sessions have been used to locate and capture Saddam Hussein?

**HYPOTHESIS ONE: LOCATION:** Saddam will be found "beneath an ordinary looking house." "It is on the outskirts of a small village," "near Tikrit." "The house is part of a small compound." It is "bordered by a dirt road and by a nearby river." "The house can be identified because it has a large tree growing at either end," and "it has a strange kind of partial second floor over the front door."



Compound new village of Ad Dawr, Iraq

**POST FIELDWORK ACCURACY ASSESSMENT:** "Saddam was found near the village of Adwar in the Tikrit area in a small compound...a river runs nearby, and a road is in front of the compound." *CNN*, December 16, 2003


The drawing at the top of the next page was made by one of the viewers, which embodied the most consensual elements. Note the two distinctively large trees at either end of the compound. Note also the odd little partial second floor in both the drawing and the image released by the government to *CNN*. And, of course, there's a gravel road that runs in front of the compound as described by the viewers.




Picture released by the Department of Defense of the compound where Saddam Hussein was located and captured. Note the correlations between the drawing and the photograph.

**HYPOTHESIS TWO: SADDAM HIDING PLACE:**

“Saddam Hussein has a hiding place.” “It is like a cavern or a ‘carved out space.’” It is “not visible but hidden underneath something.” “Breathing is possible in this small hidden space because there’s a vent tube built into this buried hiding space.”



POST FIELDWORK ASSESSMENT: In the RV session drawing, Saddam Hussein is down in a hole, as he is in the image released by the Pentagon (next column). Note the low *a priori* RV observation about the vent pipe, shown in the drawing and the confirming image.




Picture released by the Department of Defense of the compound where Saddam Hussein was located and captured. Note the correlations between the drawing and the photograph.

**HYPOTHESIS THREE: SADDAM HUSSEIN APPEARANCE:**

“Saddam won’t look anything like he normally does.” “He looks like a homeless person.” He will be “dressed in dark clothing.” He will have a “ratty,” “unkempt” “salt and pepper beard.” His hair will be “wild.” His “appearance will be disheveled.”

**POST FIELDWORK ASSESSMENT:**



Saddam Hussein minutes after being captured. Note multiple correlations with the remote viewing session data.

**HYPOTHESIS FOUR: SUPPORTERS:** At the time of his capture Saddam Hussein will have only “two or three supporters with him at the time of his discovery.”

**POST FIELDWORK ASSESSMENT:** “Troops took two other unidentified Iraqis affiliated with Saddam into custody.” *New York Times*, December 16, 2003

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**HYPOTHESIS FIVE: FIREARMS AND RESISTANCE:** “Saddam will have a gun,” “He will put up no resistance when captured.”

**POST FIELDWORK ASSESSMENT:** “Saddam was armed with a pistol, but showed no resistance during his capture.” *Virginian Pilot*, December 16, 2003

\* \* \*

**HYPOTHESIS SIX: MONEY:** Saddam Hussein will “have a quantity of money with him.” “Like a box of money.”

**POST FIELDWORK ASSESSMENT:**



The box of money found with Hussein containing U.S. hundred-dollar bills. The photo was obviously taken at the time of Saddam Hussein’s capture. It was one of the pictures that mysteriously appeared in my mailbox. (see Final Comments)

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**HYPOTHESIS SEVEN: SADDAM HUSSEIN ATTITUDE:** “He will be defiant but will not put up any resistance.” “He will be tired, and dispirited.”

**POST FIELDWORK ASSESSMENT:** “He was a tired man, and also a man resigned to his fate.” — Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, commander of U.S. forces news conference in Baghdad, December 16, 2003

## Final Comments

Workshops produce surprisingly good data in my view because people have no real idea what to expect, and nonlocal awareness is a highly numinous experience, particularly when you get positive feedback, even if that feedback lies in the future, as with the archaeological studies, which often did not produce feedback until months later. Numinosity, not time, is the operative variable.

There is even a name for this; it is called the First Time Effect, and it has been reported since the earliest days of remote viewing research. I believe this general success rate is the reason remote viewing has gone from being an obscure laboratory protocol used in research at SRI, Mobius, and PEAR, to an avocational interest on the scale of scuba diving or ballooning, with conferences, magazines, and newsletters.

The purpose of this experiment was to provide a set of hypotheses that could guide a field unit to Saddam Hussein and prepare them for what they would find when they got there. Was this accomplished? I think it is clear that the remote viewing data and the hypotheses it generated could in fact have accomplished that task. Did this information in fact play any role in his apprehension? The answer is, I do not know.

What I can say is this: About three weeks after Saddam Hussein was caught I went out to my mailbox to get the day’s mail, and in the box was a standard manila envelope. There was no address on it, nor any return address. When I opened it, it contained no note, only the two photographs you see in this paper: one of Saddam Hussein at the time of his capture; the other of the money box he had with him. These pictures obviously were taken by a member of the team that located and captured Saddam Hussein. How they came to be in my mailbox in a blank envelope I cannot say.

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and research appointments include: Senior Samueli Fellow for Brain, Mind and Healing of the Samueli Institute; founder and Research Director of the Mobius laboratory; Director of Research of the Rhine Research Center; and Senior Fellow of The Philosophical Research Society. Government appointments include: Special Assistant for Research and Analysis to the Chief of Naval Operations, consultant to the Oceanographer of the Navy. For 40 years he has been studying the nature of consciousness, particularly that aspect independent of space and time. Schwartz is part of the small group that founded modern Remote Viewing research, and is the principal researcher studying the use of Remote Viewing in archaeology.

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